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COMMENT
LYON‟S ROAR, THEN A WHIMPER:
THE DEMISE OF BROAD ARRANGER
LIABILITY IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AFTER THE SUPREME COURT‟S
DECISION IN BURLINGTON NORTHERN
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)1 imposes liability on different classes
of persons for costs incurred responding to the release, or threat of
release, of hazardous substances.2 Included within this spectrum of liable
parties are persons that contract or “otherwise arrange” for disposal or
treatment of hazardous substances.3 Under this definition of liability,
persons become liable as “arrangers” for making arrangements to dispose
of hazardous waste; this is commonly referred to as “arranger liability.”4
The United States Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington Northern
& Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States5 limits an expansive
interpretation of CERCLA arranger liability found in the jurisprudence
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.6 The Supreme Court‟s
1

42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq. (Westlaw 2010).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1)-(4); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21) (“The term „person‟ means an
individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity,
United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any
interstate body.”).
3
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3).
4
See, e.g., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 696 (9th
Cir. 1992).
5
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
6
Burlington Northern also considered the question of apportionment and the application of
2

427
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decision rejected a foreseeability test proffered by Ninth Circuit to define
a class of “broader” arranger liability7 and instead required a finding of a
party‟s “intent to dispose” to impose arranger liability.8 The Supreme
Court‟s decision also has the effect of strengthening the “useful product
doctrine,” a doctrine holding that a product manufacturer may not be
held liable under CERCLA for the sale of a useful product later disposed
of.9 The useful-product doctrine has been narrowly applied by the Ninth
Circuit.10
The consequence of the Supreme Court‟s holding in Burlington
Northern is a collective sigh of relief from products manufacturers that
would have otherwise been subjected to the broad theory of arranger
liability as spelled out by the Ninth Circuit.11 A string of decisions
throughout the Ninth Circuit, climaxing with the Eastern District of
California‟s decision in United States v. Lyon,12 had made it increasingly
more plausible for manufacturers to be named in CERCLA contribution
actions for simply selling a product that was later found to have been
released from a site.13 The Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington
Northern all but eliminates the possibility of attaching CERCLA liability
to product manufacturers that have done nothing more than sell a product
that was eventually disposed of.14
This Comment will examine the development of arranger liability
under Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, specifically looking at the impact of
Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Burlington Northern15 and the impact of the
Supreme Court‟s reversal. Section II of this Comment will briefly
examine the mechanisms for triggering CERCLA liability, specifically
the definition of arranger liability under CERCLA. Next, Section III will
joint and several liability. Id. at 1877. This Comment does not consider the Court‟s analysis of
apportionment of liability.
7
United States v. Burlington No. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948-50 (9th Cir. 2008),
rev’d by Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870
(2009).
8
Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880.
9
See id. at 1878 (“It is . . . clear that an entity could not be held liable as an arranger merely
for selling a new and useful product if the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst to the
seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to contamination.”).
10
See Burlington N, 520 F.3d at 949-50.
11
See United. States v. Lyon, No.N. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329
(E.D. Cal. 2007).
12
Id.
13
See City of Merced v. R.A. Fields, 997 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Cal. Dep‟t of
Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2005); United States
v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co, 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008).
14
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878-79 (2009).
15
Burlington N., 520 F.3d 918.
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address arranger liability in the Ninth Circuit. Specifically, this
discussion will consider “direct” arranger liability considered in Cadillac
Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States,16 which examined when
transactions constitute “arrangements for disposal,”17 as contrasted with
Burlington Northern, which expanded and applied a category of broader
arranger liability to a supplier of chemical products to a site.18 That
section will also consider United States v. Lyon,19 which utilized the
Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Burlington Northern to cast an even wider net
of CERCLA liability over manufacturers and suppliers of products that
had no role in, or a limited role in, the disposal process.20
Section IV of this Comment will review the Supreme Court‟s
decision in Burlington Northern v. United States.21 The Supreme Court
rejected the foreseeability standard proffered by the Ninth Circuit in
favor of an “intent to dispose” standard for arranger liability under
CERCLA.22 Section V examines the significance of the Supreme Court‟s
decision for future Ninth Circuit cases in addition to providing a
snapshot of liability avoided for products manufacturers in the context of
dry-cleaning litigation. Finally, this Comment concludes by suggesting
that the Ninth Circuit is basically back where it started with a standard
similar to the one announced in Cadillac Fairview.
II.

AN OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION TO CERCLA AND ARRANGER
LIABILITY

CERCLA was enacted by Congress in 1980 in response to the
serious environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.23 As
originally envisioned, CERCLA provided both a funding mechanism for
the U.S. government to undertake response activities at the nation‟s most
polluted sites and a strict liability scheme to pursue potentially

16

Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc., v. United States, 41 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 1994).
Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 565.
18
Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 807-11.
19
United States v. Lyon, N. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329 (E.D.
Cal.2007).
20
Id. at *7-17.
21
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
22
Id. at 1880.
23
See id. at 1874 (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 53 (1998)). The statute
gives broad powers to the President to command government agencies and private parties to clean up
hazardous waste sites. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 53 (1998); see also Exxon Corp v.
Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 358-59 (1986) (CERCLA was enacted, in part, in response to concerns that
leaks of hazardous chemicals from disposal sites presented a great risk to the public).
17
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responsible parties (PRPs) that polluted sites.24 CERCLA also
established the framework for private parties to pursue recovery actions
for costs incurred responding to pollution.25 The liability scheme under
CERCLA has often been described as a “polluter pays” system, with the
ultimate responsibility for the cleanup of hazardous waste on “those
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison.”26
The Ninth Circuit has described CERCLA as imposing strict liability for
the release of hazardous substances at a given site.27 Liability under
CERCLA is joint and several,28 is retroactive,29 and includes past and
future costs incurred and to be incurred in responding to the effects of
pollution.30
Liability under CERCLA is triggered, in large part, by a “release”
of “hazardous substances.”31 Both terms are defined broadly under the
Act.32 A “release” includes, but is not limited to, leaking, spilling,

24

See Martina E. Cartwright, Superfund: It’s No Longer Super and It Isn’t Much of a Fund,
18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 305-14 (2005). CERCLA, originally provided two funding mechanisms
that allowed the government to respond to the threats posed by environmental waste sites. Id. at 30506. The first funding mechanism was a strict-liability scheme that made polluters responsible for
costs incurred by the government to respond to a release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance. Id. The second CERCLA funding mechanism was the “Superfund,” a trust that was
created by taxing the petrochemical industry; the trust provided monies for the USEPA to take
emergency measures without first establishing a polluter‟s liability. Id. at 308. CERCLA‟s original
taxing authority, meant to feed the Superfund trust, expired on September 30, 1985. Id. at 312. The
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 extended the Superfund taxing authority
through December 31, 1995. Id. at 3143.
25
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f)(1) (Westlaw 2010) (establishing a right of contribution against
a liable party, as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), during or following an action by the United States
under 42 U.S.C. § 9606 or another party under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B)
allowing recovery of response costs incurred from liable parties). For a discussion of how these two
different sections work, see United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 131-33 (2002). Both
sections require that the recovery being sought is from one of the liable parties defined at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a). See id. at 131-2.
26
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2s2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir.
1986). This familiar quote has shown up in multiple opinions, in multiple circuits, aptly describing
the purpose of CERCLA‟s liability scheme. See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co.Allis Chalmers Corp.,
893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373,
1377 (8th Cir. 1989).
27
U.S. v. Burlington No.N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2008).
28
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct.1870, 1881 (2009))
(“[A]lthough [CERCLA] imposed a „strict liability standard,‟ it did not mandate „joint and several‟
liability in every case.” (citation omitted) (quoting the “seminal opinion” in United States v. ChemDyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805, 807 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (Rubin, C.J.)).
29
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2) (Westlaw 2010). Liability may attach to a past owner of
property, if releases occurred in the past. Id.
30
See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1878.
31
61C AM. JUR. 2D Pollution Control § 1271 (2009).
32
Id.
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dumping, discharging and pumping.33 The term “hazardous substances”
encompasses a wide potpourri of chemicals, including those substances
defined under similar statutes such as the Solid Waste Disposal Act, the
Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act. 34 “Hazardous substances” do
not include, generally, petroleum products that are not otherwise listed or
designated as hazardous substances.35 Last, liability under CERLA
requires that the hazardous substance be released from a “facility.”36 A
“facility” is another broadly defined term describing areas for storage,
handing or disposal of hazardous substances.37 Consequently, CERLCA
liability is triggered when a hazardous substance is released from a
facility. Based on the comprehensive language of the statutes, most
cases of pollution easily meet these three requirements, with liability
ultimately hinging on whether a party is one of a group of liable parties.38
CERCLA liability may attach to persons generally described as any
of the following: (1) the present owner and operator of a facility;39 (2) the
past owner and operator of a facility, during the time when hazardous

33

42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(22) (Westlaw 2010) (“release” means any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed
receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant)).
34
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (“The term „hazardous substance‟ means (A) any substance
designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture,
solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste
having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921] (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the
Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D)
any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous
chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to
section 2606 of Title 15.”).
35
Id. (“The term [„hazardous substance‟] does not include petroleum, including crude oil or
any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas,
natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas
and such synthetic gas).”).
36
42 U.S.C.A. at §§ 9601(a), 9607(a)(1)-(4); see also Tommy Tucker Henson, What a Long,
Strange Trip It’s Been: Broader Arranger Liability in the Ninth Circuit and Rethinking the Useful
Product Doctrine, 38 ENVTL. L. 941, 944-45 (Summer 2008).
37
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9) (“The term „facility‟ means (A) any building, structure, installation,
equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works),
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock,
or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed
of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in
consumer use or any vessel.”); see also Henson, supra note 36, at 945.
38
Henson, supra note 36, at 945.
39
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) (Westlaw 2010).
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substances were disposed of at the facility;40
[(3)] any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
41
containing such hazardous substances[;]

and (4) any transporter of hazardous substances to a facility.42
Accordingly, the United States may bring a CERCLA action to recover
costs incurred cleaning up a hazardous waste site against an owner of a
facility from which there had been a release of hazardous substances.43
A prima facie case for contribution between liable persons requires a
showing that a chemical was a hazardous substance, there was a release
of the substance from a facility, the release caused the claimant to incur
response costs, and the defendant is one of the four classes of liable
persons under CERCLA.44
Interpreting the third class of liable parties, “arrangers” under
CERCLA, is difficult due to the fact that the operative language is not
defined in the Act.45 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) defines an arranger as “any
person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances . . . .”46 The section defines both
“disposal” and “hazardous substances,”47 but it fails to give meaning to

40

42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2).(Westlaw 2010).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3).
42
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4).
43
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55-57 (1998) (describing, generally, the
mechanism for recovering response costs under CERCLA).
44
See Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069,
1076 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
45
Jeffrey Gaba, Interpreting Section 107(A)(3) of CERCLA: When Has a Person “Arranged
for Disposal?”, 44 Sw. L.J. 1313, 1317-18 (1991) (“At a minimum, section 107(a)(3) imposes
liability on generators who send waste off-site for disposal. . . . More difficult questions about the
scope of section 107(a)(3) arise when the transaction has characteristics of a sale of a product.”).
46
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3) (Westlaw 2010).
47
“Disposal” is defined at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(29) (Westlaw 2010). The terms “disposal,”
“hazardous waste,” and “treatment” have the meaning provided in section 1004 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act. Id. Under the Solid Waste Disposal Act “disposal” means “the discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any
land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.” 42
U.S.C.A. § 6903(3) (Westlaw 2010). “Hazardous substances” is defined in 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14).
41
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the phrase “otherwise arranged for.”48 A plain reading of the statute
requires that liability be attached to a party that enters into a transaction
whose purpose is the disposal of a hazardous substance.49 Legislative
analysis, in an attempt to bring meaning to CERCLA, does not generally
bear fruit.50
Parties covered under such an interpretation of § 9607(a)(3) may
include generators of waste that contract for waste hauling services in
addition to parties that serve a broker function, i.e., not owning the waste
but controlling its ultimate disposition.51 What unifies this liability
scheme is that the central purpose of the transaction involves an
arrangement for the disposal of waste.52 These cases are commonly
known as “direct” arranger liability cases.53 The application of §
9607(a)(3) becomes more complex when the transaction or arrangement
for disposal more closely resembles the sale of a product.54 In the Ninth
Circuit, these latter arranger liability cases have come to be known as
broader arranger liability cases.55
A common defense to the allegation of arranger liability is the
useful-product doctrine.56 The useful-product doctrine recognizes that the
sale of a hazardous substance, when marketed as a useful product57 that
48
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1879 (2009)
(“Because CERCLA does not specifically define what it means to „arrang[e] for‟ disposal of a
hazardous substance, we give the phrase its ordinary meaning. In common parlance, the word
„arrange‟ implies action directed to a specific purpose. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
64 (10th ed.1993) (defining „arrange‟ as „to make preparations for: plan[;] ... . . to bring about an
agreement or understanding concerning‟); see also Amcast Indus. Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir.
1993) (words “„arranged for‟ . . . impl[ies] intentional action”). Consequently, under the plain
language of the statute, an entity may qualify as an arranger under § 9607(a)(3) when it takes
intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.” (some internal citations omitted)).
49
Gaba, supra note 45, at 1318.
50
TOD I. ZUCKERMAN, THOMAS J. BOIS II & THOMAS M. JOHNSON, ENVTL. LIABILITY
ALLOCATION L. & PRAC. § 3:3 (2009) (discussing in part, the hurried legislative history of CERCLA
limiting debate on statutory language and limited committee reports that confound attempts at
understanding legislative intent). The Supreme Court has had occasion to observe that certain
sections of CERCLA “[are] not a model of legislative draftsmanship.” Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475
U.S. 355, 363 (1986). But see Gaba, supra note 45, at 1327. Professor Gaba argues that the sparse
legislative history supports a conclusion that CERCLA‟s purpose was to impose liability on
generators of waste. Id. at 1327. Arranger liability was intended to serve as a check on waste
disposal practices of generators. Id.
51
See Gaba, supra note 45, at 1318.
52
Id.
53
Henson, supra note 36, at 945.
54
See Gaba, supra note 45, at 1318-19.
55
See U.S. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948 (9th Cir. 2008).
56
See, e.g., id. at 949-50.
57
The definition of a “useful-product” in and of itself is often disputed, as plaintiffs and
defendants attempt to distinguish between primary products and secondary products or byproducts
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is later disposed of, is not an arrangement for disposal as envisioned by
CERCLA.58 While there is no per-se rule that any sale of a “useful
product” escapes CERCLA liability, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly
stated that when a manufacturer does nothing more than sell a product to
an end user, the manufacturer has not incurred liability for the
generation, transportation, or arrangement for the disposal of waste.59
III. THE EVOLUTION OF ARRANGER LIABILITY IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
The Ninth Circuit has given significant treatment to the question of
what constitutes arranger liability and has likely expanded the reach of
arranger liability further than any other circuit.60 “Direct” or “traditional”
arranger liability under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) contemplates CERCLA
liability attaching to a party involved in a transaction wherein the “sole
purpose of the transaction is to arrange for the treatment or disposal of
hazardous wastes.”61 However, this is not to say that the question of the
purpose of a transaction cannot be disputed.62 Thus the central inquiry in
the application of arranger liability goes beyond the parties‟ own
characterization of the transaction to determine if there was an
arrangement for disposal.63
The Ninth Circuit also recognizes a broader arranger liability where
the disposal may be contemplated by the transaction but is not the
primary focus of the transaction, i.e., the arranger “is either the source of
the pollution or manages its disposal.”64 The Ninth Circuit‟s
interpretation of arranger liability hit its apex in Burlington Northern.65
that may have market value. See Henson, supra note 35, at 36, at 944-45. This distinction and which
type of product rightfully triggers the useful-product doctrine are beyond the scope of this Comment
and were not at issue in the Burlington Northern matter.
58
See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1994); see
also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 1990)
(rejecting a theory of arranger liability based on a transaction where the defendant sold transformers
containing PCBs to the plaintiff; the plaintiff was liable for response costs arising out of PCB
contamination).
59
See, e.g., Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
Cir. 2007).
60
See Henson, supra note 36, at 946-48 (summarizing recent 9th Circuit case law regarding
broader arranger liability).
61
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002).
62
See, e.g., Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 752 (9th Cir. 1994) (disputing
the characterization of the sale of used battery casings as an arrangement for transporting or
disposing of wastes); Cadillac Fairview/Cal./California, Inc. v. United. States, 41 F.3d 562, 566 (9th
Cir. 1994) (described infra notes 73-and 83 and accompanying text).
63
See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc., v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1994).
64
United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948 (9th Cir. 2008).
65
Henson, supra note 36, at 943 (Burlington Northern constituted the “most expansive scope
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Examining factors such as ownership, control, and the role of the usefulproduct doctrine, the court suggested that liability should be imposed
when disposal is a foreseeable byproduct of any transaction.66 The
impact of the Ninth Circuit‟s holding was immediately seen in United
States v. Lyon.67 In Lyon, The District Court for the Northern District of
California relied on the analysis provided by the Ninth Circuit in
Burlington Northern to suggest that defendants that only supplied new
products or equipment to a facility from which there had been a release
were now covered by CERCLA under the guise of arranger liability.68
A.

DIRECT ARRANGER LIABILITY: CADILLAC FAIRVIEW/CALIFORNIA V.
UNITED STATES69

Direct arranger liability will be found when the removal and release
of hazardous substances is not only the consequence but the very purpose
of a transaction.70 Factors such as control of the waste disposal process or
ownership of the hazardous substance may be informative of arranger
liability, but ultimately they are not requirements.71 Thus a court will
look to the substance of the transaction to determine if a finder of fact
could infer that what the parties contemplated was an arrangement for
the disposal of waste.72
Prior to Burlington Northern, the Ninth Circuit decided Cadillac
Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States.73 In that case, the court
examined a series of transactions between Dow Chemical (Dow) and
several rubber companies, finding that a party may be liable under §
9607(a)(3) without owning the hazardous substance or controlling the
disposal process.74 In Cadillac Fairview, the plaintiff brought suit under
CERCLA against Dow, several rubber companies, and the government

[of liability] accepted by any federal court of appeals.”).
66
Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 948-49.
67
United States v. Lyon, N. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329.
68
Id. at *7-19.
69
Cadillac Fairview/Cal./California, Inc., v. United .States, 41 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 1994).
70
See Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 565 (“the question is whether the fact-finder could infer
from all the circumstances that a transaction in fact involves an arrangement for the disposal [or
treatment] of a hazardous substance. The record before the district court was sufficient to support a
finding that the rubber companies arranged to transfer contaminated styrene to Dow for completion
of the re-distillation process that led to the release of the hazardous substances.”) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
71
See id.
72
See id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 565-66.
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for costs incurred removing styrene and other hazardous chemicals from
the plaintiff‟s property.75 Dow and the rubber companies had produced
synthetic rubber at the site in question under contract with the U.S.
government during World War II.76 Dow “sold” styrene to the rubber
companies to process into synthetic rubber.77 Dow then bought back, at a
reduced price, approximately 30-40% of the styrene that had become
contaminated during the manufacturing process and could not be
converted to rubber.78 Dow then distilled the contaminated styrene to
remove the contaminants.79 The distilled, “recycled,” styrene was then
sold back to the rubber companies, and the residual contaminants from
the distillation process were disposed of in pits near Dow‟s plant.80 After
the war effort was over, the government sold the property, which
ultimately ended up with the plaintiff, Cadillac Fairview.81
Dow filed cross-claims for contribution, alleging that the rubber
companies were liable as arrangers under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) for
sending the contaminated styrene back to Dow for treatment.82 In
response, the rubber companies argued that they could not be arrangers
because they did not own or control the disposal process that resulted in
the release of hazardous substances.83 In prior Ninth Circuit cases
addressing arranger liability, ownership and control had been factors
indicative of arranger liability.84
The court disposed of the rubber companies‟ arguments, holding
that neither the language of the statute or cases interpreting it had limited
the application of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) to require that a responsible
party own the hazardous substance or control the process that resulted in
the release of contaminants.85 The determinative inquiry, the court stated,
was the one first proffered in Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials &

75

Id. at 564.
Id. The contract required that the companies would construct, lease, and operate a
government-owned facility on land owned by the government. Id. at 563.
77
Id. The styrene and raw materials used by Dow and the rubber companies were actually
owned by the United States government, reimbursing the companies for the costs incurred and
paying the companies a fee to operate the various facilities. Id. at 563.
78
Id. at 564.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 564-65.
83
Id. at 565.
84
See Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 752 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing JonesHamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992) for the proposition
that ownership or control of hazardous substances serves as evidence of arranging for disposal).
85
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1994).
76
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Services, Inc.:86 “whether the fact-finder could infer from all the
circumstances that a transaction in fact involves an arrangement for the
disposal or treatment of hazardous substance.”87 The Ninth Circuit stated
that the “[r]emoval and release of the hazardous substances was not only
the inevitable consequence, but the very purpose of the return of the
contaminated styrene to Dow.”88 On this basis the court found the rubber
companies could be liable as arrangers under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).89
The court also addressed the useful-product doctrine. The rubber
companies argued that the transaction was one that involved the sale of a
useful product, not an arrangement for disposal, thus invoking the usefulproduct doctrine.90 The court stated that it does not necessarily matter
how the transaction is cast; characterization of a transaction as a “sale”
does not immunize the transaction from the reach of statute.91
The importance of Cadillac Fairview is the court‟s acknowledgment
of factors considered to be determinative of arranger liability and
rejection of these touchstones as per-se requirements under CERCLA.92
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit considered control of the process that led
to a release of hazardous substances, and ownership of the substances
released.93 Removing per-se requirements of “ownership” or “control”
would become central themes in expanding arranger liability.94 The
finding of arranger liability will be based on an inquiry of all facts and

86

Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Services., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 694-95 (9th Cir.
1992). Jones-Hamilton was the first case by the Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit to consider the
issue of arranger liability, adopting the test proffered by the Eighth Circuit in United. States. v. Aceto
Agrrgic. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). Id. at 695. Ironically, the application of
arranger liability in Jones-Hamilton, may be considered a “broader arranger” liability case under the
term coined by the Ninth Circuit in later cases.
87
Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 565 (quoting Jones-Hamilton v. Beazer Materials and &
Services., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1992)) (citations omitted).
88
Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 566.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 566.
91
Id.
92
See id. at 565.
93
Id.
94
See id. In later cases, the Ninth Circuit would reiterate the point that ownership or control
were not prerequisites to finding arranger liability, but factors to be considered. See United States v.
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We believe requiring proof of personal
ownership or actual physical possession of hazardous substances as a precondition for [arranger]
liability . . . would be inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of CERCLA.” (quoting United
States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 951 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating, “[n]one of these cases, however,
indicates that ownership or control at the time of transfer are the sine qua non of nontraditional
arranger liability”).
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circumstances to determine the intent of the parties.95
B.

BROAD ARRANGER LIABILITY: UNITED STATES V. BURLINGTON
NORTHERN & SANTA FE RAILWAY CO.96

Cadillac Fairview addressed the concept of “direct” or “traditional”
arranger liability.97 The concept and application of a broader arranger
liability, however, was fully realized in the Ninth Circuit‟s decision in
United States v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co.98 In Burlington
Northern, the Ninth Circuit expanded arranger liability to cover
situations where disposal of waste is not the sole purpose of the
arrangement but a foreseeable byproduct of the transaction.99 Defining
this class of broader arranger liability, the Ninth Circuit stated that
factors such as control and ownership will largely influence the
determination of broader arranger liability but are not dispositive of the
liability outcome.100 Further, the Ninth Circuit‟s opinion in Burlington
Northern adopted a very narrow application of the useful-product
doctrine, significantly limiting its immunizing effect.101
Brown and Bryant (B&B) was an agricultural chemical and storage
and distribution company, operating in Arvin, California.102 Included in
B&B‟s operations were the purchase, receipt, and storage of two
agricultural chemicals, including a chemical called D-D, produced by
Shell Oil Company (Shell).103 During the 1960s and 1970s, Shell
encouraged its customers, including B&B, to purchase D-D in bulk.104
Shell delivered the D-D, FOB destination via a common carrier, meaning
that Shell delivered the chemical at its own risk and expense until

95

See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d,
129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
97
Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 565; see also Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 948.
98
Id. Burlington Northern is the first Ninth Circuit case to provide a robust discussion and
find broad arranger liability. Broad arranger liability had been previously considered in United
States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002), but not applied. In fact the first broader
arranger liability case was likely Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Services., Inc., 973 F.2d
688 (9th Cir. 1992), which discussed a transaction that fits the description of broader arranger
liability found in Burlington Northern.
99
Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 948-49, 952.
100
Id. at 951.
101
See id. at 949-50.
102
Id. at 930.
103
Id. at 930-31. D-D is an agricultural chemical, specifically a soil fumigant that is designed
to kill nematodes and microscopic worms that attack the roots of crops. Id. at 931.
104
Id.
96
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accepted by B&B.105 Trucks delivered the D-D to B&B‟s large storage
tanks by hoses: “[t]he process was quite messy, with frequent spills” of
D-D.106 B&B‟s own storage practices also resulted in releases from
storage tanks, in part a result of the corrosive nature of D-D.107
In 1983, the California Department of Toxic Substance Control
(DTSC) investigated the site and discovered that B&B was in violation
of numerous hazardous waste laws; a separate United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigation confirmed
substantial soil and groundwater contamination at the Arvin facility.108
Both EPA and DTSC undertook remedial actions at the Arvin site.109 In
1996 EPA and DTSC filed actions against PRPs, including B&B and
Shell, for reimbursement of response costs incurred investigating and
remediating contamination at the site.110 The district court found Shell
liable as a person that arranged for disposal of hazardous substances
under § 9607(a)(3).111
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit distinguished direct arranger liability,
as discussed in Cadillac Fairview, from the category of broader arranger
liability first recognized in United States v. Shell Oil.112 The court stated
that in broader arranger liability, the transaction between the parties
contemplates “disposal as a part of, but not the focus of, the transaction;
the „arranger‟ is either the source of the pollution or manages its
disposal.”113 The court further described broader arranger liability as
resulting from transactions where the arranger did not contract directly
for the disposal of hazardous substances but in which disposal was a
foreseeable byproduct of the transaction.114
The court also instructed that disposal need not have been
purposeful to warrant the imposition of liability in a broader arranger
105

Id.
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 931.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 932.
111
Id.
112
See United. States. v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002). Shell appears to be the
first Ninth Circuit case to apply the nomenclature of “broader” arranger liability, while Burlington
Northern, appears to be the first Ninth Circuit case to use the terminology and give considerable
discussion to the distinction between the two before finding liability under a broad arranger theory of
liability. Ironically, the concept of a broader arranger liability was introduced in Shell, by a group of
oil companies including Shell. Id. at 1055.
113
United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F. 3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002)), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1870
(2009) (emphasis in original).
114
Id. at 948-49.
106
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liability context.115 The court stated that because the definition of
“disposal” under CERCLA includes unintentional actions such as
leaking, the disposal by the arranger did not need to be intentional.116 The
court concluded that arranger liability could be found even when the
transaction resulted in a “disposal” that was a result of leakage or other
unintentional or non-purposeful conduct.117
The court in Cadillac Fairview held that the central query was
whether the transaction in fact constituted an arrangement for disposal.118
In finding liability, the court described a transaction where the purpose
and inevitable consequence of the transaction was disposal.119 Burlington
Northern held that this inquiry could be expanded.120 The Ninth Circuit
was no longer solely considering the intent of the transaction, as
instructed by Cadillac Fairview¸ but was assessing liability where the
transaction had the secondary effect of disposal or even an unintentional
element of disposal.121The court justified the expansion as being in line
with the larger remedial goals of CERCLA.122
The Ninth Circuit also addressed issues of ownership and control as
the guideposts for analyzing arranger liability.123 While noting that there
is no statutory requirement of control as a requisite to the imposition of
liability, the court stated, “we have tended to view control as a „crucial
element‟ in determining whether the party arranged for disposal.”124 The
court added that it viewed “ownership of hazardous substances at the
time of disposal as an important factor in nontraditional, indirect arranger
115

Id. at 948-49.
Id. at 949.
117
Id. The issue of intentional versus “non-purposeful” disposal in the context of arranger
liability is also an important point of departure between the various circuits. See David W. Lannetti,
Note, “Arranger Liability” Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA): Judicial Retreat from Legislative Intent, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 279,
291-312 (1998).
118
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1994).
119
Id. at 566.
120
See United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 949 (9th Cir. 2008),
rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (“an entity can be an arranger even if it did not intend to dispose of the
product. Arranging for a transaction in which there necessarily would be leakage or some other form
of disposal of hazardous substances is sufficient.”).
121
Id. at 949.
122
See id. at 948 (“We have avoided giving the term „arranger‟ too narrow an interpretation to
avoid frustrating CERCLA's goal of requiring that companies responsible for the introduction of
hazardous waste into the environment pay for remediation. Accordingly, we have recognized, in
addition to „direct‟ arranger liability, a „broader‟ category of arranger liability in which disposal of
hazardous wastes is a foreseeable byproduct of, but not the purpose of, the transaction giving rise to
PRP status.”) (citations omitted).
123
See id. at 950-51.
124
Id. at 951 (citing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2002)).
116
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liability cases.”125 Neither factor creates a per-se rule for finding or
dismissing broader arranger liability, but instead constitutes “useful
indices or clues toward the end of „looking beyond defendants‟
characterizations to determine whether a transaction in fact involves an
arrangement for the disposal of a hazardous substance.‟”126 The Ninth
Circuit held that the district court‟s findings demonstrated that Shell had
sufficient control over, and knowledge of, the transfer process to be
considered an arranger within the meaning of CERCLA.127
The court also considered the useful-product doctrine as a defense
raised by Shell.128 The court stated that the defense is not available where
the sale of a useful product “necessarily and immediately results in the
leakage of hazardous substances.”129 Specifically, the court highlighted
the fact that D-D can never realize its usefulness to B&B, if it is spilled
before B&B can use it in agricultural application.130 Such an event
prevents a product from its intended use, thus stripping the product of
immunity.131 The court explained that Shell‟s liability was a not function
of the nature of the product, but from the disposal of the product during a
process orchestrated by Shell; thus liability was derived not from the
manufacturing of products, but from Shell‟s role in the leakage prior to
use.132 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit did not disavow the useful product
defense, but clarified that it is intended to apply after a product is used,
creating a narrow window in which it will be applied.
In concluding that Shell was liable as an arranger under the broader
categorization, the Ninth Circuit keyed in on three determinative factors.

125
Id. (citing Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
126
Id. at 951 (quoting United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373,1381 (8th
Cir. 1989)).
127
Id. The Ninth Circuit points to six factors that demonstrate that Shell had sufficient control
to impose arranger liability: “(1) [s]pills occurred every time the deliveries were made; (2) Shell
arranged for delivery and chose the common carrier that transported its product to the Arvin site; (3)
Shell changed its delivery process so as to require the use of large storage tanks, thus necessitating
the transfer of large quantities of chemicals and causing leakage from corrosion of the large steel
tanks; (4) Shell provided a rebate for improvements in B & B‟s bulk handling and safety facilities
and required an inspection by a qualified engineer; (5) Shell regularly would reduce the purchase
price of the D-D, in an amount the district court concluded was linked to loss from leakage; and (6)
Shell distributed a manual and created a checklist of the manual requirements, to ensure that D-D
tanks were being operated in accordance with Shell‟s safety instructions.” Id. at 962 (italics in
original).
128
Id. at 949.
129
Id. at 950.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 950 n.34.
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First, Shell was not required to have intent to dispose of waste to have
arranged for disposal under CERCLA.133 Disposal for CERCLA
purposes could be a passive byproduct of a transaction, with liability to
be imposed where disposal is a foreseeable byproduct of the
transaction.134 Second, as held in Cadillac Fairview, no per-se rule
regarding ownership or control of the hazardous substance was necessary
for a finding of arranger liability, but that in a broader arranger liability
scheme, control becomes central to the query on liability.135 Last,
immunity was not available to Shell under the useful-product doctrine
because Shell‟s practices prevented the product from being put to its
intended use.136 Shell‟s liability, therefore, resulted from its role in the
disposal of the product, not the product itself.137
As a result of the Ninth Circuit‟s decision, broader arranger liability
is more expansive and more amorphous.138 The Ninth Circuit‟s approach
expands the inquiry past the parties‟ intention, prescribed by Cadillac
Fairview, to find liability where disposal is a foreseeable byproduct of
the subject transaction.139 The Ninth Circuit in Burlington Northern did
not suggest a concrete set of criteria to establish arranger liability, but
instead suggested that arranger liability will be a consequence of a factintensive inquiry at the trial level.140
C.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT‟S BURLINGTON NORTHERN DECISION
APPLIED: UNITED STATES V. LYON141

Within six months after Burlington Northern, the Ninth Circuit‟s
expanded view of arranger liability reared its head.142 In U.S. v. Lyon, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied

133

Id. at 949, 961.
Id. at 948-49.
135
Id. at 951.
136
Id. at 950.
137
See id.
138
See Henson, supra note 36, at 943.
139
United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2008).
140
Id. at 809.
141
United States v. Lyon, No. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329 (E.D.
Cal. 2007).
142
Lyon was decided after the Ninth Circuit‟s opinion in United States v. Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co, 502 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2007), but before this opinion was superseded by United
States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co, 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit‟s
superseding opinion still features the same conclusions and the majority of the analysis as the
original opinion. Thus, although Lyon cites to the now defunct 2007 Burlington Northern opinion, its
analysis should still be considered valid.
134
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a chemical manufacturer‟s motion to dismiss a claim of arranger
liability.143 The manufacturer‟s only connection to the site in question
had been the sale of new chemical product, through an intermediary, to
an end user at the site.144 Relying chiefly on the third-party plaintiff‟s
arguments that Burlington Northern had cast a broad net of liability and
undermined the useful-product doctrine, the Eastern District of
California held that the issue of the chemical manufacturer‟s liability
could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.145
The EPA instituted an action against the first-party defendants,
including Lyon/Tondas (Lyon), the owner of a site where a dry cleaner
had been located, for past and future response costs arising out of
groundwater contaminated with percholorethylene (PCE), a solvent used
in dry-cleaning operations.146 Lyon subsequently filed a third-party
complaint against 22 third-party defendants, including five chlorinated
solvent manufacturers.147 Vulcan Materials Company (Vulcan) was one
of the five third-party defendant solvent manufacturers.148 Lyon‟s thirdparty complaint alleged, in part, that the third-party defendants had
arranged for disposal of hazardous substances at the site.149 Lyon did not
allege that Vulcan sold PCE directly to the dry cleaner at the site, but
rather that distributors purchased and resold chlorinated solvents to the
dry cleaner operator.150 Further, the Lyon made no allegations that
Vulcan: “(1) had contact with [the dry cleaner]; (2) was aware of which
dry cleaners purchased PCE from a solvent distributor; or (3) possessed
authority or control over subsequent PCE disposal of by [the dry cleaner]
of PCE in waste form.”151
Largely based on the Lyon parties‟ interpretation of Burlington
Northern, the District Court denied Vulcan‟s motion to dismiss on the
claim of arranger liability.152 The district court pointed to the Ninth
Circuit‟s recognition of a broader category of arranger liability “in which
disposal of hazardous waste is a foreseeable byproduct of, but not the
purpose of, the transaction giving rise to PRP . . . status.”153 Citing the

143

Id. at *25.
Id. at *6.
145
Id. at *16, 20.
146
Id. at *4.
147
Id at *5.
148
Id. at *4-5.
149
Id. at *5.
150
Id. at *6.
151
Id. at *6.
152
See id. at *11-16.
153
Id. at *11 (citing United. States. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 502 F.3d 781, 807
144
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Ninth Circuit‟s decision, the district court stated that a transaction that
necessarily resulted in leakage or some other form of disposal of a
hazardous substance was sufficient for liability under CERCLA‟s
statutory scheme.154 As the district court conceded, the problem for
Vulcan was reconciling the standard on a motion to dismiss and the
theory of broader arranger liability as spelled out in Burlington
Northern.155 In essence, arranger liability is found when parties contract
to sell hazardous substances that are then disposed of.156
Addressing the useful-product doctrine, the district court concluded
that the characterization of a transaction as a sale does not immunize the
transaction from an inquiry as to whether the product is used for its
intended purpose.157 If the product could never be put to its intended use
because of leakage inherent in the manufacturer‟s transfer and delivery
process, the useful-product doctrine could not be applied under
Burlington Northern.158 While the Ninth Circuit had refused to hold a
party liable for merely selling a useful product that was later disposed of,
in the CERCLA context, “hazardous substances are generally dealt with
at the point where they are about to, or have become, wastes.”159 In Lyon,
the defendants argued:
the useful product doctrine does not apply when chemical leakage is
inherent and contemporaneous with the manufacturer‟s transfer
process and the manufacturer has sufficient control over and
knowledge of the transfer process to be considered a CERCLA
160
arranger.

The questions surrounding Vulcan‟s “disposal,” or the necessary
(9th Cir. 2007), superseded on denial of reh’g en banc, 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S.
Ct. 1870 (2009)).
154
Id. at *12 (citing United States v. & Santa Fe Ry. Co, 781. 808 (9th Cir. 2007), superseded
on denial of reh’g en banc, 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009)).
155
Id. at *16 (“[Third party defendant‟s] alleged disposal or leakage of hazardous materials
are factual questions not subject to [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6) resolution. At this point, this Court is
not in a position to determine whether [third-party defendant], as a PCE manufacturer and seller, is a
disposer or discharger of PCE waste. Although they do not provide a model pleading, the
Lyon/Tondas allege enough for arranger liability and to avoid the useful product defense.”).
156
See id.
157
Id. at *15-6.
158
Id. at *15; see also U.S. v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co,, 520 F.3d 918, 950
(9th Cir. 2008) (“The useful product cases have no applicability where, as here, the sale of a useful
product necessarily and immediately results in the leakage of hazardous substances. In that
circumstance, the leaked portions of the hazardous substances are never used for their intended
purpose.”) (emphasis in original).
159
Lyon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329, at *14 (citation omitted).
160
Id. at *15.
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inquiry to determine if disposal had taken place, were factual issues that
could not be resolved on a motion for dismissal.161
Last, the court concluded that, while ownership is not a prerequisite
to arranger liability, arranger liability based on a theory of ownership
was satisfied for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Burlington
Northern by the allegation that Vulcan had sold PCE to the dry cleaner;
the sales were indicative of Vulcan‟s possession.162
Lyon’s interpretation of Burlington Northern may have pushed the
barriers as to what the Ninth Circuit had intended.163 Specifically, the
Lyon decision did not distinguish the role played by Shell in the delivery
process versus Vulcan‟s rather remote role.164 Vulcan sold to an
intermediary and had no knowledge of the end user.165 Shell maintained
an ongoing role in refining the bulk transfer process of D-D to B&B.166
Therefore, addressing one of the “useful indices” of broader arranger
liability, Lyon dispensed with the need for control that figured
prominently in the Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Burlington Northern.167
This conclusion appears to ignore the fact that Vulcan sold to an
intermediary.168 This obscured fact also impacts the application of the
useful-product doctrine. If Vulcan had sold to an intermediary that in
turn sold to a dry cleaner that Vulcan had no knowledge of, contact with,
or control over, the remoteness of Vulcan from the ultimate site of
disposal should have triggered the useful-product doctrine as described
in Burlington Northern. Finally, the district court found that the other
touchstone of arranger liability—ownership—was satisfied because at
one time Vulcan owned the product.169 The district court failed to
distinguish the facts in Burlington Northern, namely that Shell owned the
chemicals at the time the transaction was entered into.
The sum total of the court‟s ruling on Lyon can be interpreted as

161

Id. at *16.
Id. at .*19-20.
163
Meline MacCurdy, “Useful Product” Exception Rejected and CERCLA Claim Against
Chemical Manufacturer Is Allowed To Proceed, MARTEN L. GROUP ENVTL. NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008,
www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20080123-cercla-exception-rejected.
164
Id.
165
Lyon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329, at *6.
166
United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 809 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Shell arranged for delivery of the substances to the site by its subcontractors; was aware of, and to
some degree dictated, the transfer arrangements; knew that some leakage was likely in the transfer
process; and provided advice and supervision concerning safe transfer and storage. Disposal of a
hazardous substance was thus a necessary part of the sale and delivery process.”).
167
See id. at 809-10.
168
See Lyon, 2007 U.S. Dist., at LEXIS *6.
169
Id. at *18-.19.
162
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creating a quasi-products-CERCLA liability scheme, undermining the
useful-product doctrine and ensnaring a chemical manufacturer that had
no contact with the ultimate purchaser in costly CERCLA litigation.170
Notably, the intersection of “foreseeability” intertwined with pure
manufacturer liability sounds in traditional products liability. It could be
argued that differences between Burlington Northern and Lyon suggest
that the district court‟s result is an aberration or simply the result of
Burlington Northern applied under a more generous motion-to-dismiss
standard. But the Lyon decision may also reflect a Ninth Circuit trend to
impose liability on parties relating to dry-cleaning facilities.171 The
decision does suggest a broader reach of arranger liability based on the
underpinnings of Burlington Northern.172
The result in Lyon should be distinguished from City of Merced v.
R.A. Fields173 and California Department of Toxic Substances Control v.
Payless Cleaners.174 All three cases presented similar facts, similar
claims of arranger liability, and similar outcomes for the defendants.175
The difference lies in the measuring stick by which the district court
assessed arranger liability and facts or lack of facts material to the usefulproduct doctrine.
In City of Merced the court appeared willing to exonerate a
manufacturer who “does nothing more than sell a useful, albeit
hazardous product” as measured by analysis seen in Cadillac
Fairview.176 In City of Merced a third-party action was initiated against a
manufacturer of dry-cleaning chemicals.177 The gravamen of the thirdparty claim was arranger liability attaching to the manufacturer.178
170
This is an observation that is shared by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States,
The American Chemistry Council, and the American Petroleum Institute, as evidenced in their
amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court prior to the Court considering the Ninth Circuit‟s
ruling in Burlington Northern. See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. as
Amici Curiae, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (Nos. 07-1601, 07-1607), 2008 WL 6059064, 2008 WL
5026653 at 17-18.
171
MacCurdy, supra note 162; see also Brad Marten, Dry Cleaning Franchisor Tagged with
Cleanup Costs, MARTEN L. GROUP ENVTL. NEWS, Nov. 2, 2005, www.martenlaw.com/news/?20
051102-dry-cleaning-cleanup.
172
MacCurdy, supra note 162.
173
City of Merced v. R.A. Fields, 997 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
174
Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (E.D.
Cal. 2005).
175
See supra text accompanying notes 143-52 and infra text accompanying notes 176-85.
176
City of Merced, 997 F. Supp. at 1332.
177
Id. at 1329-30 (including defendant Vulcan Materials Company, the same movant in
Lyon).
178
Id. at 1331-32; see also Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F.
Supp. 2d 1069, 1076-81 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
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However, the court indicated that it simply did not have sufficient facts
to find for the defendant in light of the plaintiff‟s allegations that the
transaction went beyond supplying the chemical in question.179 Lyon can
be distinguished from City of Merced. The district court in Lyon accepted
that the defendant had no contact with the third-party plaintiff, that the
defendant was not aware that the third-party plaintiff had purchased the
defendant‟s product, and that there was no subsequent authority or
control of third-party plaintiff‟s disposal.180 Employing facts similar to
Lyon, a logical conclusion could be drawn that the court in City of
Merced could have found for third-party defendants. Such a result would
be contrary to the result in Lyon.
In Payless Cleaners, the court denied the third-party defendant‟s
motion for summary judgment on arranger liability not because the
manufacturer, the third-party defendant, sold a product, but because of
the manufacturer‟s alleged control over the installation process that led to
disposal.181 The third-party plaintiffs had alleged that the third-party
defendant was a manufacturer of dry-cleaning equipment and the
successor of a franchisor for a dry-cleaning operation.182 Further, the
third-party plaintiff alleged that the third-party defendant designed,
manufactured, and installed dry-cleaning machines.183 The district court
stated that allegations of a product sale did not support a finding for an
arrangement for disposal because the transaction could be described
“only as the sale of a useful good which, through its normal use, created
a waste byproduct.”184 The court denied the motion for summary
judgment however, based on allegations that the product manufacturer,
in its role as franchisor, chose the location of waste discharge points at
the facility in question in addition to physically installing machines and
connecting machines to the discharge points.185 Lyon lacked the
additional allegations found in Payless Cleaners that the product
manufacturer physically installed and chose the waste discharge
points.186 A strong argument exists that absent the additional facts in
Payless Cleaners, beyond the sale of the product, the district court would
have granted the third-party defendant‟s motion for summary judgment,
179

City of Merced, 997 F. Supp. at 1332.
United States v. Lyon, N. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329, at *6.
181
Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 107880 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
182
Id. at 1076.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 1078.
185
Id. at 1080.
186
See id.
180
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an outcome different than Lyon.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES ARRANGER LIABILITY:
BURLINGTON NORTHERN’S APPEAL FROM THE NINTH CIRCUIT
The Supreme Court considered Shell‟s appeal from the Ninth
Circuit‟s decision imposing arranger liability in Burlington Northern.187
In its brief discussion of arranger liability, the Court quickly undid much
of the Ninth Circuit‟s decision and significantly curtailed the future
application of a broader arranger liability.188 The Court eschewed the
notion of control or foreseeability under a broader arranger liability
theory and instead required a definitive finding of intent.189 In so doing,
the Court set the stage for highly intensive fact-finding inquiries in order
to determine arranger liability status.190 The Court also impliedly
reaffirmed the useful-product doctrine.191
In defining transactions that might trigger arranger liability, the
Court drew two bookends. At one end, the Court placed clear-cut cases
of direct or traditional arranger liability, and at the other, transactions
that would invoke the useful-product doctrine.192 Shell‟s transaction with
B&B was somewhere within this spectrum.193
[I]f an entity were to enter into a transaction for the sole purpose of
discarding a used and no longer useful hazardous substance[, liability
would attach under § 9607(a)(3)]. It is similarly clear that an entity
could not be held liable as an arranger merely for selling a new and
useful product if the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst
to the seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to
contamination. Less clear is the liability attaching to the many
permutations of “arrangements” that fall between these two
extremes—cases in which the seller has some knowledge of the
buyers‟ planned disposal or whose motives for the “sale” of a

187

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878 (2009).
See id. at 1880.
189
Id.
190
See id. at 1879 ( “There is no bright line between a sale and a disposal under CERCLA. A
party‟s responsibility . . . must by necessity turn on a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the
transaction.”) (quoting Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R. Co., 142 F.3d
769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998)).
191
See id. at 1878-79.
192
See id.
193
See id.
188
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194

The Court observed that lower courts, to define liability within this
continuum, have often conducted fact-intensive inquiries beyond the
parties‟ characterization of the transaction as a disposal or a sale to
discern if the arrangement was one Congress intended to fall under
CERCLA.195 The Court agreed with that analysis but stated that the
inquiry ends within the limits of the statute.196 Looking to the plain
language of the statute, the Court stated that to “arrange” implies action
directed to a specific purpose, and therefore to “arrange” under §
9607(a)(3), an entity must take intentional steps to dispose of a
hazardous substance.197
Describing Shell‟s practices, the Supreme Court stated that
knowledge of leakage or spilling is insufficient to hold a party
responsible for having planned a disposal. 198 Accordingly, to be liable
under the Act, Shell would have to have entered into the transaction with
the intention that at least some of the D-D be disposed of by one or more
of the methods described in § 6903(3); the Court observed that the
evidence before the district court did not establish this.199 This
conclusion is notable for two reasons. First, the Court‟s conclusion
forecloses the Ninth Circuit‟s holding that arranger liability may be
founded upon any transaction that includes disposal as a foreseeable
byproduct.200 Second, the Court seemed at odds with the Ninth Circuit‟s
view on the effect of the district court‟s findings. The Supreme Court
concluded that Shell‟s knowledge of continuing spills and leaks and
unsuccessful efforts to stem these problems were insufficient to support a
finding that Shell had arranged for the disposal of D-D and therefore
liable under § 9607(a)(3).201
What the Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington Northern makes
clear is that arranger liability will attach only when an entity deliberately
plans for disposal of an unused and useful product.202 A PRP‟s

194

Id. at 1878-79 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1879.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 1879-80.
198
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009).
199
Id.
200
See id.
201
Id.
202
Gregory Weimer, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States: The
Supreme Court Provides Guidance on Arranger Liability and Apportionment, 35 VT. BAR J. 46, 47
(2009).
195
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knowledge of leaking and spillage may be used in the determination of
intent but is not entirely dispositive of the issue.203 Thus, sales of new
and useful products will likely not be held to be arrangements for
disposal.204
What the decision does not clear up, however, is how much
knowledge of spillage and leakage will amount to the requisite level of
intent to impose arranger liability.205 Further, it is not clear what remains
of a broader arranger liability scheme in general. It would appear that the
Supreme Court‟s holding would favor a results analogous to Cadillac
Fairview and less likely to support a ruling similar to that in U.S. v. Lyon.
206
The Court‟s ruling makes it more difficult to prove that a party
involved in a new product “sales” transaction was an arranger.207
V. THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT‟S DECISION IN THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
The impact of the Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington Northern
on the Ninth Circuit‟s broader arranger liability scheme can be assessed
both in attempting to quantify what remains of broader liability and
moreover, in its practical, immunizing effect on products manufacturers.
With respect to understanding what remains of broader liability, the
Supreme Court‟s requirement to find an “intent to arrange” for disposal
undermines liability based on a foreseeability test. In addition, the intent
requirement impliedly broadens the scope of the useful-product doctrine.
On a practical level, the Supreme Court‟s decision likely immunizes
“pure” products manufacturers from significant liability under a theory
of arranger liability.
In a certain respect, the arranger liability inquiry in the Ninth Circuit
will not change after the Supreme Court‟s decision. The “useful indices”
of ownership and control will still be useful as applied to understanding
when an entity “takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous
substance.”208 Added to the arsenal of useful indices will be the

203

Id.
Marc Lawrence, To Arrange or Not To Arrange: Intent Is the Question, 88-OCT MICH. B.
J. 48, 50 (2009).
205
Brad Marten, U.S. Supreme Court Holds that Superfund Liability is Not Joint and Several
Where A Reasonable Basis for Apportionment Exists; Court Also Narrows Arranger Liability,
MARTEN L. GROUP ENVTL. NEWS, May 4, 2009, www.martenlaw.com/news/?20090504-superfundliablity.
206
See Lawrence, supra note 204, at 50.
207
Id. at 50-52.
208
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1879 (2009).
204
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knowledge that an entity‟s product will be spilled or leaked.209 As stated
in the Ninth Circuit opinions, with respect to ownership and control, and
as stated in the Supreme Court‟s decision with respect to knowledge,
none of these factors will necessitate a finding of liability, but they will
instead be useful in providing evidence of the intent to dispose.210
Consequently, under the Supreme Court‟s holding, the sum of the useful
indices must now total intent to dispose instead of foreseeability. All
these factors will be examined under an inquiry into the intent of the
parties, to determine if a transaction is really an arrangement for
disposal, as originally suggested in Cadillac Fairview.211
The most significant aspect of the Supreme Court‟s decision
however, may be the interplay between the requirement of intent and the
useful-product doctrine, and the resultant gap in CERCLA liability that is
created. To reiterate, the useful-product doctrine immunizes
manufacturers, under a theory of arranger liability, “for selling a useful
product containing or generating hazardous substances that later were
disposed of.”212 The Supreme Court arguably upheld this principle
without mentioning it by name.213 The “intent to dispose” requirement
arguably eliminated liability for a manufacturer once its product is
transferred to a common carrier. Recall that the issue in Burlington
Northern was a “disposal” that took place after the product left the hands
of the manufacturer but before the product was put to its intended use.214
The process of D-D transfer, however, was one largely orchestrated by
Shell.215 As stated by the Ninth Circuit, “Shell‟s liability derives not from
its role as a manufacturer of a useful product but rather from its role in
leakage prior to use.”216 Without broad arranger liability, CERCLA
liability does not attach to Shell for its role in the transfer of the product.
The Supreme Court, in ruling as it did, created a liability shield for
products shipped by common carrier, notwithstanding any subsequent
209
Id. at 1880. However, “knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity „planned for‟
the disposal, particularly when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the legitimate sale of an
unused, useful product.” Id.
210
Id.
211
See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1994).
212
United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 949 (9th Cir. 2008),
rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (italics in original).
213
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878-9 (2009).
214
See Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 950.
215
That Shell “orchestrated” the transfer of D-D may be matter of dispute. See id. at 931 n.5
(citing to the district court‟s findings that Shell controlled the transfer process). But see Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009) (describing Shell‟s knowledge
of the transfer process and even steps to mitigate loss of product).
216
Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 950 n.34.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

25

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 6
06_MAGNUS PRINTER VERSION

452

5/22/2010 11:57 AM

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 3

“gray area”217 involvement such as Shell‟s. As stated by Judge Richard
Posner of the Seventh Circuit, describing unintentional disposal under
CERCLA, “in the context of the shipper who is arranging for the
transportation of a product, „disposal‟ excludes accidental spillage
because you do not arrange for an accident except in the Æsopian sense
illustrated by the staged accident.” 218 The distinction between the
liability for the manufacturer and transporter, Judge Posner explained, is
that
when the [manufacturer] shipper is not trying to arrange for the
disposal of hazardous wastes, but is arranging for the delivery of a
useful product, he is not a responsible person within the meaning of
the statute and if a mishap occurs en route his liability is governed by
219
other legal doctrines.

Thus, CERCLA liability does not attach to Shell‟s role in
influencing the delivery of its product.220 A different outcome may have
been likely if Shell had transported using its own fleet221 or if the
Supreme Court had found that Shell‟s involvement went beyond mere
knowledge of leaks, spills and unsuccessful efforts to curtail spillage
from the transfer process it required.222 Requiring intent to dispose and
dispatching a test based on foreseeability, the Supreme Court has largely
eliminated the CERCLA “gap coverage” provided by a theory of broader
arranger liability.
The practical impact of the Supreme Court‟s holding in the Ninth
Circuit is best seen in its juxtaposition with the Ninth Circuit‟s approach
in Lyon, which represented the climax of the Ninth Circuit‟s embrace of
a broader arranger liability.223 At one end of the spectrum, after Lyon,
smaller PRPs saw a potential avenue for relief against the oppressive
costs of site cleanup by attaching liability to most any product
manufacturer whose product may have ended up in a disposal stream.
After the Supreme Court‟s decision, this option has largely withered
away. Conversely, chemical and products manufacturers, and their
insurance carriers, were relieved after the Supreme Court‟s opinion in

217

See supra note 127 and notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993).
219
Id.
220
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009).
221
See Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751.
222
See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880.
223
See United States v. Lyon, N. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329, at
218

*16.
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Burlington Northern, the prospect of a products-based CERCLA liability
having been diminished. The basis of these emotions, small PRPs‟ gloom
and manufacturers‟ relief, are easily illustrated.
Using facts analogous to Lyon, City of Merced and Payless
Cleaners, San Francisco dry cleaners provide a quick snapshot of the
impact of the Supreme Court‟s decision. In San Francisco, there are
approximately 360 dry cleaners.224 Of those, almost twenty percent use
PERC.225 PERC is the same chemical at issue in Lyon,226 Payless
Cleaners,227 and City of Merced.228 Historically, a majority of dry
cleaners have discharged PCE through sewer laterals, one of two primary
routes for disposal.229 Down-drain disposal of PCE and resultant
sewerage leakage was the cause of contamination in Payless Cleaners
and has been observed in other dry-cleaning cases.230 Arguably, based on
the aforementioned numbers and a Lyon-type holding, product
manufacturers face the specter of liability at over seventy sites in San
Francisco alone for having done nothing more than having sold their
product. This does not take into account historic sites that may not
currently house dry-cleaning operations and sites that may have switched
from PERC to alternative cleaning methods. Subsequent to the Supreme
Court‟s holding in Burlington Northern, absent additional factors, these
same manufacturers of PERC or other dry-cleaning products are likely to
be exempt from liability.
Neither Lyon nor the Ninth Circuit‟s holding in Burlington Northern
stated that every CERCLA contribution action against a product
manufacturer would ultimately be successful under an arranger theory.
They did indicate that the issue was not going to be resolved on a motion

224
Marisa Lagos, S.F. Takes Green Issue to Dry Cleaners, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 19, 2009, at A1, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-09-19/news/17206825_1_dry-cleaners-chemicalbusinesses.
225
Id.
226
Lyon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *4.
227
Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074
(E.D. Cal. 2005).
228
City of Merced v. R.A. Fields, 997 F. Supp. 1326, 1329 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
229
State Coalition for Remediation of Drycleaners, A Chronology of Historical Developments
in Dry Cleaning (Nov. 2007), available at www.drycleancoalition.org/download/drycleaninghistorical_developments.pdf. A 1998 survey by the International Fabricare Institute, revealed that
70% of the 900 respondents queried indicated that they discharged waste water from dry cleaning
equipment into sewer laterals or septic tanks. Id.
230
Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. A common allegation in California drycleaning litigation is that PERC is discharged during dry-cleaning operations into municipal sewer
systems, which in turn leak or otherwise discharge the PERC. See, e.g., City of Modesto
Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d, 865, 867-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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for dismissal.231 The consequence of a holding similar to Lyon was also
to require a manufacturing defendant to be subjected to additional
litigation costs. The prospect of prolonged discovery may have resulted
in more cost-of-defense settlement providing additional monies to
address response costs. Further, while it was unlikely that equipment or
chemical manufacturers would roll over by virtue of a ruling such as
Lyon, the specter of strict and joint and several liability could have
become an important bargain chip at the settlement table.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fate of a broader arranger liability in the Ninth Circuit is
uncertain after the Supreme Court‟s reversal in Burlington Northern.
Expansion of arranger liability after is unlikely, however, especially in a
situation where a defendant may invoke the useful-product doctrine232 or
the hazardous substance in question was shipped via common carrier.233
The Ninth Circuit‟s holding in Burlington Northern and the premise in
Lyon that CERCLA liability may attach to products manufacturers via
foreseeability is no longer good law. A court within the Ninth Circuit
will likely revert to the analysis suggested in Cadillac Fairview,
inquiring into the nature of a transaction, including looking beyond the
defendants‟ characterization of the transaction.234 Such a court will look
to find intent or deliberate steps toward disposal in order to impose
arranger liability.235 The necessity of intent all but eliminates CERCLA
liability for products manufacturers as envisioned by the Ninth Circuit‟s
holding in Burlington Northern and the district court in Lyon.
VII. AFTERWARD
In early 2010, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California would become one of the first courts within the
Ninth Circuit to tackle the scope of broader arranger liability subsequent
to the Supreme Court‟s ruling in Burlington Northern.236 In Hinds

231

Lyon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329, at *16.
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878-79 (2009).
233
See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993).
234
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565-6th66 (9th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 696 (9th Cir. 1992))
(citations omitted).
235
See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879.
236
See Adam Orford, District Court Applies BNSF Arranger Liability Test, Dismisses
232
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Investment v. Team Enterprises237 the district court would address facts
and circumstances similar to those in Lyon,238 City of Merced,239 and
Payless Cleaners.240 The outcome, however, would be very different.241
The court concluded that as a matter of law plaintiffs‟ allegations against
dry cleaning equipment manufacturers were not sufficient support a
finding of arranger liability and the claims were dismissed.242
The general allegations in Hinds243 are familiar ones. The plaintiffs
were owners of property where the defendant, Team Enterprises, had
operated a dry cleaning business.244 The plaintiffs‟ sought response costs
incurred responding to PCE contamination at the site.245 It was alleged
that defendant Kirrberg/Multmatic (Kirrberg) was liable as an arranger
under CERCLA for having manufactured, assembled, installed,
maintained, repaired, and/or sold dry cleaning machinery used at the
site.246 Plaintiffs also alleged that Kirrberg provided instructions and
information regarding the handling and disposal of waste waters

CERCLA Claim Against Dry Cleaning Machine Manufacturers, MARTEN L. GROUP ENVTL. NEWS,
Apr. 1, 2010, www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20100401-bnsf-arranger-liability-test.
237
The district court would issue three separate orders between January 15, 2010 and March
12, 2010: Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 289116
(E.D. Cal. 2010) (entitled Order on Cooper Industries, LLC‟s F.R.Civ.P. 12 Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
43)); Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 796844 (E.D.
Cal. 2010) (entitled Order on R.R. Street & Co. Inc.‟s F.R.Civ.P 12 Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint (Doc. 76.)); Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO
GSA, 2010 WL 922416 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (entitled Order on Kirrberg/Multimatic‟s F.R.Civ.P. 12
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 78.)).
238
See supra text accompanying notes 142-51.
239
See supra text accompanying notes 176-80.
240
See supra text accompanying notes 181-84.
241
See Hinds, 2010 WL 289116, at *5, *7-8, *10; Hinds, 2010 WL 796844, at *7-8, *16;
Hinds, 2010 WL 922416, at *6, *8, *16.
242
Hinds, 2010 WL 289116, at *10; Hinds, 2010 WL 796844, at *16; Hinds, 2010 WL
922416, at *16.
243
See Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL
796844 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA,
2010 WL 922416 (E.D. Cal. 2010). The district court‟s ruling on these to motions are substantially
similar. The district court‟s ruling on the Cooper motion is distinguishable both on the grounds that
Cooper was a third-party defendant, allegations against Cooper included franchisor liability and that
plaintiff and that the district offered a more robust discussion of “intent to dispose” based on
arguments raised by plaintiff Hinds in response to motions by R.R. Street and Kirrberg/Multimatic.
Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 289116 (E.D. Cal.
2010), at *1-2, *4-5; see Hinds, 2010 WL 796844, at *6-7; Hinds, 2010 WL 922416, at *5-6. On
account of the relative similarity and for purposes of brevity and clarity, the remaining analysis will
only focus on the Kirrberg/Multimatic order.
244
Hinds, 2010 WL 922416, at *1.
245
Id.
246
Id.
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contaminated with PCE generated by the machinery.247 The central thrust
of plaintiff‟s allegations was that Kirrberg‟s manufacture and design of
the dry cleaning equipment constituted intentional steps to dispose of
wastes. 248
The district court conceded that plaintiffs‟ allegations constituted
the basis for knowledge of disposal but that this in itself, did not rise to
the level of “intentional disposal of a hazardous substance.”249 The court
stated, “[Kirrberg] at best knew that Multimatic machine . . . „performed
a separate and distinct function of waste disposal of used PCE . . .‟”250
However, citing the Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington Northern,
the district court stated that knowledge of disposal is insufficient to prove
intentional disposal.251
The juxtaposition of “knowledge” with ownership and control were
also important considerations for the court.252 Clarifying plaintiffs‟
authority, the court stated that “[w]e believe that ownership or
possession, knowledge and control are the most critical factors in this
[arranger liability analysis . . . .”253 In citing the factors involved in the
arranger liability analysis, the district court stressed the importance, and
plaintiff‟s failure, to demonstrate the ownership factor necessary to find
arranger liability; the PCE must have been owned by the operators of the
machinery.254
Addressing the useful-product doctrine, the court stated that the
plaintiff‟s allegations did not suggest that the machinery at issue was
either a hazardous substances or a transaction for disposal of such.255 The
court‟s analysis, citing heavily from Payless Cleaners, affirmed that the
useful-product doctrine, where the transaction involves the sale of a
useful good, remains undisturbed.256
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Id.
Id. at *5; see also Orford, supra, note 236.
249
Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 922416 at
*6 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
250
Id.
251
See id. (“[Kirrberger] raise a valid point that „knowledge of likely disposal‟ does not
impose arranger liability given that „knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity „planned
for‟ the disposal . . .”) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870,
1880 (2009).
252
Hinds, 2010 WL 922416, at *5.
253
Id. (citing Morton International, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 678 (3rd Cir.
2003)). It is notable that the Morton court stressed the importance of ownership or possession as
necessary requirement to arranger liability. Id.
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Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 922416 at
*6 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
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Id. at *8.
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Id. (“Plaintiffs offer nothing substantial to negate the useful product defense . . . The
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If Hinds is a harbinger of arranger liability within the Ninth Circuit
a few conclusions may be drawn. First, three factors will be weighed
heavily to find an intent to dispose and a subsequent finding of arranger
liability: knowledge, control, and ownership or possession.257 Second,
pleadings will require specificity sufficient to divine more than one of
these factors.258 Last, a manufacturer of equipment, who does nothing
more than sell a product, is likely immune from arranger liability under a
theory that design does not equate intent to dispose in addition to
possessing immunity under the useful product doctrine.259
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[second amended complaint] does not allege that the Multimatic machine itself is a hazardous
substance and, in turn, that its sale is an arrangement to dispose of hazardous substances.”).
257
Id. at *5-6; see also supra text accompanying notes 208-11.
258
See supra text accompanying notes 245-49; see also Orford, supra note 236.
259
Hinds, 2010 WL 922416, at *5-6, *7-8; see also supra text accompanying notes 231;
Orford, supra, note 236.
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